Warsaw Yesterday, Budapest Tomorrow?

Can Hungary follow in the Polish opposition’s footsteps and what would that mean for the future of “illiberal democracy”?

With the Hungarian elections approaching, Europe is waiting to see if Viktor Orbán, the notorious promoter of “illiberal democracy,” can be toppled by his technocratic challenger, Péter Magyar. Central and Eastern Europe has seen similar political pivots in recent years, most notably Poland’s unexpected government change in 2023. Could that same script play out in Hungary, and what are the actual prospects for re-democratization after 16 years of Fidesz rule?

Could a “Polish Summer” be blooming in Hungary?

At the start of 2023, the prevailing narrative in Poland suggested that the right-wing populist Law and Justice (PiS) party was coasting toward a third consecutive term. While PiS did indeed emerge as the largest political force in the October 2023 elections, it fell short of a parliamentary majority. This cleared the path for a new government under Donald Tusk. The opposition’s breakthrough hinged on a pivot in strategy: unlike the broad “catch-all” coalition that failed in Hungary in 2021, the Polish parties focused on targeted mobilization of its own electoral base and a direct, uncompromising confrontation with PiS.

This political shift was buoyed by a vibrant civil society, particularly women’s rights organizations mobilized against restrictive abortion laws. Simultaneously, PiS undermined its own standing through a series of strategic blunders. An attempt to prosecute Tusk backfired spectacularly and triggered a large-scale protest in his support and for democratic renewal in June 2023; this momentum culminated just before the vote with the “March of a Million Hearts,” an even larger demonstration of public defiance.

Péter Magyar’s current political playbook in Hungary offers a stark contrast. While Poland’s success was built on a loose cooperation of established opposition parties, Magyar is betting on a high-stakes “one-man show.” He has pointedly distanced himself from the existing political establishment—often derided as the “old opposition”—ruling out any cooperation from the outset. Casting himself as a defector from the very elite and system he now condemns, Magyar’s strategy hinges on a double-fronted positioning: a frontal assault on Fidesz policy matched by a blistering critique of the opposition’s long-standing impotence.

His primary weapons are a digital-first approach on social media which allows him to effectively bypass the Fidesz-controlled propaganda machine, and his relentless in-person meetings with the electorate on the ground. By taking his campaign directly to the provinces, he is methodically mobilizing disillusioned Fidesz supporters and undecided voters who previously found no credible alternative in the old guard. Much like Tusk in Warsaw, Magyar has mastered the art of the mass rally; his massive demonstration last October proved his ability to translate online momentum into a formidable physical presence in the public square.

The Battle of Narratives

Parallels also emerge in the opposition’s policy platforms. Both Tusk and Magyar have anchored their campaigns in a moral and institutional indictment of the status quo, framing the upcoming elections not merely as a change in leadership, but as a fundamental systemic reset. But still, their focus remains fixed on the “bread-and-butter” issues: aggressive cost-of-living relief, a relentless fight against inflation, and a radical overhaul of both the education and healthcare systems. These are precisely the sectors that have suffered from systematic neglect under the illiberal regimes of both nations.

Fidesz and PiS display such striking similarities that it is hard to shake a sense of déjà vu. In the scorched-earth digital campaigns of PiS in 2023 and Fidesz in 2026, a singular core message dominates: painting opposition leaders as ultimate boogeymen and casting them as mere puppets of Brussels. Yet, a quintessential right-wing populist campaign requires more than just an internal enemy. While PiS attempted to weaponize the specter of migration as its primary threat narrative, the tactic lacked the visceral impact it carried in 2015. Orbán, by contrast, is leaning heavily into the terrifying prospect of a widening Ukraine war and direct involvement of the EU and Hungary. In recent weeks, the ruling party has calculatedly escalated Hungarian-Ukrainian tensions. Government-aligned outlets are flooding the internet with AI-generated combat footage, while soldiers have been deployed to city streets and critical infrastructure, and Ukrainian nationals are being detained by Hungarian authorities. This escalation is a desperation move: Fidesz has seen every other campaign theme fall flat. Amid a deep-seated mood of public discontent, only one message seems to resonate: “If the Orbán government falls, the war is inevitable.”

After the Ballot: Can Illiberal Damage Be Undone?

A victory at the polls in an illiberal system is no guarantee that democratic institutions can be rebuilt, especially if the incoming government commands only a razor-thin majority held together by a disparate fractious coalition. Poland is currently a case in point: two years after the transfer of power, the democratic restoration has stalled. The dual burden of governing while simultaneously attempting systemic reform is a daunting task, made harder by a coalition spanning liberals, the left, and predominantly conservatives. What was hailed as a strategic asset during the campaign has morphed into a liability in a coalition government. Nowhere is this more evident than in the stalemate over abortion rights; despite its pivotal role in mobilizing voters, the coalition partners remain hopelessly deadlocked on the issue, leaving the restrictive status quo untouched.

Equally concerning is the institutional paralysis gripping the judiciary. Essential reforms are being strangled by a double bind: the presidential veto and a Constitutional Tribunal still staffed by loyalists of the former regime. Furthermore, the liberal-conservative camp’s defeat in the 2025 presidential election means that much of the reformist agenda is effectively dead-on arrival.

There are, however, silver linings, most notably in the media landscape, as reflected in rising international press freedom rankings. Yet even here, the path is fraught; measures intended to “de-politicize” public broadcasting have themselves drawn fire for being heavy-handed. For ethnic and sexual minorities, the climate has improved significantly, if only because the state-sponsored vitriol previously pumped through public media has been silenced. Progress is also visible in terms of accountability, where numerous cases of abuse of power and corruption are now being prosecuted, though, in a telling twist, some of the accused, like the former Minister of Justice, Zbigniew Ziobro, have already been granted asylum in Orbán’s Hungary.

What would this mean for Hungary?

Even if current polling suggests a lead for the TISZA party, any electoral victory risks ending in an institutional dead end due to the “tilted playing field” of the electoral system. Without the two-thirds majority required for constitutional amendments, a new government would face an existential breaking point. As already seen in Poland, loyalist institutions and the head of state could veto every meaningful reform. This leaves the opposition with an agonizing dilemma: remain legally castrated, or resort to “politically creative”—yet constitutionally dubious—shortcuts.

A fundamental difference, however, lies in the parliamentary arithmetic. While Tusk was forced to manage a sprawling, heterogeneous coalition, such a broad alliance is virtually off the table in Hungary. This is primarily because Péter Magyar’s TISZA party has emerged as the sole credible challenger to Fidesz, while the rest of the opposition has withered. This marginalization of the “old opposition” was cemented by the 2024 European elections, where TISZA catapulted to the top of the opposition ranks, effectively consigning traditional parties to political obsolescence.

According to current projections, only Fidesz, TISZA, and the far-right Mi Hazánk would clear the electoral threshold. Since Magyar has categorically ruled out any pact with the far right, TISZA is left with a daunting task: it must dismantle the system almost entirely on its own.

Warsaw yesterday, Budapest tomorrow?

Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of PiS, once famously declared his ambition to “bring Budapest to Warsaw“— a nod to Viktor Orbán’s “illiberal democracy,” which he subsequently spent years attempting to replicate. Today, however, the question has been flipped: will Budapest soon be turned into “Warsaw”? The Hungarian campaign has entered a bruising final phase, and as the vote approaches, every scenario remains on the table. Yet even should TISZA emerge victorious, the demise of illiberal democracy is far from guaranteed. A new government would face a truly Herculean task, one that, as the Polish precedent demonstrates, is as contentious as it is complex.

Title image credit: Donald Tusk / Péter Magyar