Warsaw Before Vienna: Why is Péter Magyar’s First Official Visit Abroad Taking Him to Poland?

In his victory speech, Péter Magyar already promised that his first visit abroad as head of government would take him to Poland to strengthen the “thousand-year-old friendship.” Now, he is keeping his word, visiting Warsaw, Gdańsk, and Kraków on May 20. Only after that are Vienna and Brussels scheduled to follow. However, his visit goes far beyond mere symbolism between two countries that have voted out illiberal governments in recent years. His long-term goals likely include not only restoring bilateral relations but also strengthening a shared alliance within the EU.

Goal 1: A New Beginning and Reconciliation Between Estranged “Brothers”

While Magyar’s remark about the “thousand-year-old friendship” may sound pompous, it is not entirely exaggerated. Deep historical ties bind the two countries, both of which were founded around the turn of the first millennium. This connection is also reflected in the saying, “Pole and Hungarian, two brothers…” as well as their shared Friendship Day on March 23rd. The scarcity of historical conflicts between them and mutual support during times of crisis adds to the positive perception of each other. In Poland, for instance, people fondly remember that Polish refugees were warmly welcomed during World War II, despite the two nations officially being on opposing sides. Similarly, the role of Polish freedom fighters like General Józef Bem in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848/49, as well as the expressions of solidarity during the 1956 uprising, remain deeply significant.

However, these close relations cooled significantly. Although Fidesz and PiS were the closest of allies for years, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to a breaking point. While Warsaw became the spearhead of support for Ukraine, Budapest actively undermined EU sanctions. This illiberal alliance collapsed entirely with Donald Tusk’s election victory in 2023. The Hungarian government reacted with defamation campaigns against the new Polish leadership, loudly weaponizing the “Polish scenario” as a warning against a regime change at home.

This alienation also affected civil society: according to Polish polls, sympathy for Hungary plummeted by a massive 21 percentage points in 2022. This is precisely where Péter Magyar comes in: his trip to Warsaw is intended to end this estrangement and open up a new chapter in bilateral relations.

Goal 2: The Symbolic End of the Illiberal Protective Alliance in Central Europe

“Warsaw yesterday, Budapest tomorrow?”—the question raised in our last article became reality on April 12. After 16 years in power, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz was voted out of office, a fate that had already befallen the Polish PiS party before them. Yet, despite these parallels, the starting conditions for democratic consolidation differ fundamentally. While the dismantling of democracy did not go as far in Poland as it did in Hungary, Donald Tusk’s government currently lacks the constitutional majority needed to overcome the obstructionist policies of the PiS-loyal President, Karol Nawrocki. Péter Magyar, on the other hand, secured a two-thirds majority. Paradoxically, he could dismantle the illiberal state using the exact same instruments to his advantage that currently constrain Tusk in Poland. This concentration of power could accelerate the re-democratization process—though only if the Tisza Party is genuinely willing to relinquish its sweeping majority..

This new dynamic in Hungarian politics isolates the remaining actors of the Hungarian-Polish illiberal system. President Nawrocki, who acts as the central roadblock to reform in Poland, loses his most crucial backing with the change of power at the Danube. Shortly before the election, Nawrocki had backed Orbán with a surprise visit. In return, Tusk and his Civic Coalition (KO) positioned themselves clearly at Magyar’s side. Magyar’s victory deals a severe strategic blow to the Polish opposition, solidifies the Tusk government’s position on the European stage, and confirms the upward trend the Civic Coalition has enjoyed since October 2025. Furthermore, Tusk and Magyar share similarities: despite being stylized as liberals by the West, both are essentially conservative realpolitikers. This discrepancy between Western expectations and their actual agenda is particularly evident on the issue of migration, where both are consistently implementing the hardline course they announced during their election campaigns.

The break is especially clear when it comes to legal accountability. Until now, Budapest offered protection to former Polish government officials, such as former Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro or his deputy Marcin Romanowski, shielding them from investigations into the Pegasus scandal. Magyar’s mocking warning to his Polish allies—telling them “not to buy new furniture from IKEA,” an insinuation that they should not get too comfortable in their Budapest exile because their extradition was imminent—deprives PiS of its most important EU refuge. With the fall of the “Orbán system,” the cross-border protective shield for corruption collapses; Ziobro’s subsequent flight to the United States seals the definitive end of this alliance against the rule of law.

Magyar’s visit is a deliberate show of solidarity with Donald Tusk, as well as an opportunity to exchange views on unblocking frozen EU funds ahead of his trip to Brussels. It marks the end of the illiberal protective alliance and sends a powerful signal for democratic renewal in Central Europe: even illiberal democracy is not invincible.

Goal 3: A Pro-European Duo in Central Europe

Two years ago, Donald Tusk spoke of a prevailing “Orbán fatigue.” While a less-than-diplomatic reference to Hungary’s Ukraine policy, the Fidesz leader had long since become a liability for both the Polish government and the EU. With Orbán’s departure, the Kremlin loses its Trojan horse, which directly strengthens Poland’s security.

While the PiS-Fidesz alliance was always fractured by Russia policy, Magyar is now shifting course. Although he continues to prioritize national interests regarding Ukraine—such as the protection of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia or agricultural issues—he is clearly changing the tone of the Ukraine policy. In doing so, he removes the single largest obstacle to a genuine Polish-Hungarian partnership.

A core promise of Magyar’s is Hungary’s return to the European center by revitalizing the Visegrád Group (V4). Surprisingly, Robert Fico and Andrej Babiš, once Orbán’s loyal allies, are also seeking proximity to the new Prime Minister. A shared selfie accompanied by the message, “The Three Musketeers are waiting for the fourth and the rebirth of the V4,” already signaled a willingness to reactivate the alliance. However, it remains to be seen how Magyar will position himself between the liberal-conservative Tusk and the populists from Prague and Bratislava. Furthermore, Magyar is thinking beyond the V4: expanding it to include Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, and Romania into a “V8” group could create a new geopolitical heavyweight within the EU.

Within the EU institutions, Tusk and Magyar enjoy a strategic advantage: both belong to the conservative EPP group, which strengthens their influence over the European agenda. Their potential partners, on the other hand, operate in isolation: Babiš has aligned himself with the right-wing populist “Patriots for Europe,” while Fico’s Smer party remains suspended from the Socialists and Democrats (S&D). This constellation establishes the Tusk-Magyar tandem as the new trendsetter in Central Europe.

The End of (Orbán’s) History?

Yet, despite all the euphoria, the new alliance will have to push through significant challenges, as Warsaw and Budapest simply operate under different realities in certain areas. The biggest points of friction remain Hungary’s dependence on Russian energy and aid for Ukraine. While Tusk is pushing for a swift break from Moscow, Magyar must perform a risky balancing act: he has to demonstrate European solidarity without jeopardizing national energy security or having to take responsibility for rising energy costs. The future of the V4 will depend on whether these differences can be managed constructively so that the shared goal of a strong Central Europe does not fall by the wayside.

Furthermore, in terms of foreign policy, the two countries are looking in different directions. For Poland, whose borders meet Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, military security is the absolute priority. This focus is increasingly shifting northward: the security of the Baltic Sea is now strategically so vital that it occasionally eclipses the importance of traditional V4 cooperation. This is reflected in Poland’s increased presence at the summits of the NB8 (Nordic-Baltic Eight).

Magyar, on the other hand, is increasingly seeking partners of comparable size and geopolitical alignment to establish cooperation on equal footing. His planned visit to Vienna underscores his intention to deepen strategic and economic cooperation with Austria. The objective is to use this networking to strengthen and potentially expand regional cooperation in Central Europe, ultimately positioning the region better within the EU.