Why the EU cannot afford Poland and Ukraine to be at odds
When President Zelensky renamed an elite military unit after the ‘Heroes of the UPA’ in late May, President Nawrocki responded by stripping him of the Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state honour in June. Although their controversial decisions precipitated a deep diplomatic crisis, both presidents saw their actions widely supported by the public in their respective countries. While critics accused them of pandering domestic audiences, the situation is far more nuanced. The core of the dispute lies in the divergent historical memory cultures within both countries.
Your hero, my enemy
The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was rooted in the Organisation of Ukrainian nationalists that had resisted Polish rule during the interwar period and fought against Soviet domination in pursuit of an independent Ukrainian state. Following the Ukrainian independence in 1991, public commemoration increasingly emphasised the UPA’s role in resisting Soviet domination, partly because Soviet narratives had overwhelmingly portrayed the movement as anti-Soviet. The narrative where UPA is seen as a symbol of Ukraine’s movement for liberation has become more powerful and has acquired stronger ideological resonance in the context of Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s full-scale invasion.
Yet for Poland, the UPA is synonymous with the perpetrators of the 1943–1944 Volhynian massacres, which is estimated to have claimed between 40,000 and 100,000 civilian lives. Resentment persists also because the memory of these events was suppressed in communist Poland and remained unresolved as a bilateral issue even after 1989. The perceived inaction of Polish politicians in pursuing this issue has further exacerbated public frustration. At the same time, this darker chapter of the UPA remains less well known in Ukrainian society and is primarily the subject of debate among historians and memory scholars.
The UPA is thus regarded differently in Ukraine and Poland for reasons that are historical as well as political. Unlike the previous tensions, this dispute has moved beyond a bilateral squabble to one with strategic implications for the EU.
More than memory culture at stake
It did not take long for the consequences to follow with President Zelenskyy cancelling his planned attendance at the high-profile Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026, held in Gdańsk this June. The conference was considered a success, but the demarche sparked a debate on how these tensions may have a detrimental impact on bilateral business relations, particularly the Polish investments planned for Ukraine once its post-war reconstruction begins.
The growing societal resentment is already palpable for the nearly one-million Ukrainian community and refugees in Poland. Following recent feuds, public perception of Ukrainians has soured among one-third of Poles, according to a Rzeczpospolita survey. This friction threatens to accelerate a longer-term decline in public sentiment, a shift recently highlighted by CBOS data showing that, for the first time, more respondents (52%) oppose hosting Ukrainian refugees than support it. Although this does not indicate a total collapse in support for Ukraine, the recurrence of such disputes in the media and political discourse creates an environment where the initial solidarity has become more conditional and politically scrutinised. Further escalation may risk weakening public support for military assistance to Ukraine. Opposition right-wing parties are already exerting pressure, contributing to the government’s recent decision to disclose the transfer of missiles for Patriot air defence systems to Ukraine.
This feud has become vulnerability and fertile ground for Russian influence campaigns more so as tensions peaked ahead of the Poland’s commemoration of July 11 anniversary of the Volhynian massacres when Russia disseminated archival documents of disputed authenticity to exacerbate the rift. The UPA is viewed negatively in Russia as well, though this history is insufficient to foster pro-Russian sentiment in Poland. It does, however, provide a breeding ground for online campaigns to keep the issue alive and stoke societal resentment.
With the 2027 parliamentary elections in Poland approaching, the dispute is only set to intensify, becoming a primary driver of campaigns by right-wing parties. Law and Justice (PiS) has long established credibility here, notably through its unsuccessful 2013 push to officially define the Volhynian massacres as genocide. With the issue moving beyond the hard-right fringe, and with the race expected to be tight, no major party can afford to appear “soft” on national memory. That includes the ruling Civic Coalition (KO) of Donald Tusk, which will be tempted to adopt a more uncompromising stance to avoid attacks by its political opponents.
A bigger game to lose: From the EU enlargement to security
Major opposition forces, most notably the Law and Justice (PiS) party and far-right Konfederacja, have increasingly linked Ukraine’s path to EU membership to the resolution of historical grievances. A deadlock on such a compromise would mirror the North Macedonian case, where bilateral historical disputes were used by neighbouring EU members Greece and Bulgaria to stall the accession process.
Ukraine’s progress towards EU membership is thus becoming entangled with unresolved memory disputes. European Parliament has been more than an observer when it described President Zelensky’s decision as an “unnecessary and unprovoked escalation” which was “not in line with European values.” Even members of the European People’s Party, among Ukraine’s most consistent supporters, have argued that assessments of Ukraine’s accession process should take into account discourse on historical issues. Such arguments are likely to be welcomed by those already sceptical of Ukraine’s membership, from agricultural producers concerned about competition to right-wing political forces seeking additional grounds to slow enlargement.
Ukraine will require strong allies during difficult negotiations over the Common Agricultural Policy and the future distribution of the EU budget. With almost 60% of Poles opposing Ukraine’s EU membership as of June and Poland’s President describing Ukraine’s accession as a “threat to Polish agriculture”, both governments face a growing political challenge.
Polish-Ukrainian cooperation is also vital for effective European security. Poland’s territory serves as NATO’s principal forward logistics hub for supporting Ukraine through strategic transport air and maritime corridors that function as critical gateways for heavy armour and allied shipments. Given this potential, no other European country could replace Poland’s role on the Alliance’s eastern flank in the foreseeable future. If Poland ever opts out from the European architecture supporting Ukraine’s response to Russian aggression, the consequences will extend far beyond Ukraine’s resilience. Also for Poland’s security architecture and defence against Russia, Ukraine is crucial.
Deescalation in sight?
“I thank the presidents of Poland and Ukraine for working so intensely during the NATO summit in Ankara to resolve a problem that they themselves created,” Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski remarked with characteristic sarcasm. His frustration stemmed from the fact that in just a few weeks, the presidents’ actions had effectively undone years of progress achieved through quiet diplomacy, which had led to the first exhumations of Polish victims of UPA.
The dispute over historical memory is far from marginal and can become a political weapon that risks undermining Europe’s collective resilience at a time when unity remains its most valuable strategic asset. This awareness has gradually permeated the political elites in both countries, though pivoting from long-held, entrenched positions has proven difficult.
A step toward defusing tensions has been President Zelensky’s recent decision to open historical archives concerning the Volhynian tragedy and to authorise broader search and exhumation permits. This shift, already praised by prime-minister Tusk, could help disarm far-right exploitation of the past and create an opportunity for a constructive, although challenging, dialogue. If utilised effectively, a mutually beneficial strategy would allow Poland and Ukraine to prioritise a shared future in a secure Europe while practising greater tact regarding the sensitivities of their neighbours and partners.
